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Probabilistic Language Models in Cognitive
Neuroscience: Promises and Pitfalls
Kristijan Armeni, Roel Willems, Stefan Frank
Highlights
1. Aspects of incremental language comprehension can be modeled with
probabilistic language models.
2. Formal linguistic information content is used to build predictors of
cognitive processing.
3. We review fMRI and M/EEG studies that analyzed comprehension
data with language models.
4. We discuss advantages, potential pitfalls and future challenges of the
approach.
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Abstract
Cognitive neuroscientists of language comprehension study how neural com-
putations relate to cognitive computations during comprehension. On the cog-
nitive part of the equation, it is important that the computations and processing
complexity are explicitly defined. Probabilistic language models can be used to
give a computationally explicit account of language complexity during compre-
hension. Whereas such models have so far predominantly been evaluated against
behavioral data, only recently have the models been used to explain neurobiolog-
ical signals. Measures obtained from these models emphasize the probabilistic,
information-processing view of language understanding and provide a set of tools
that can be used for testing neural hypotheses about language comprehension.
Here, we provide a cursory review of the theoretical foundations and example
neuroimaging studies employing probabilistic language models. We highlight
the advantages and potential pitfalls of this approach and indicate avenues for
future research.
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1. Introduction
Neuroimaging studies of language comprehension have over the course of the
past decades generated a wealth of data which have inspired several neurobiolog-
ical models (e.g., Friederici, 2012; Hagoort, 2013; Hickok & Poeppel, 2007). Such
studies typically correlate or compare task-based changes in cognitive processing5
with changes in neural metabolic demands by means of functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (Logothetis, 2008) or changes in electrophysiological responses
with magneto- or electroencephalography (Luck, 2005; Hansen et al., 2010). In
a complementary fashion, brain stimulation techniques can be used to stimu-
late or perturb neural populations and thus to probe the relevant pathways for10
language comprehension (Devlin & Watkins, 2007).
More broadly, one of the main goals of cognitive neuroscience is to identify
the explanatory relations between neuronal and cognitive computations that
account for behaviour (Poldrack, 2010; Poeppel, 2012). This requires explicit
formalization of the hypothesized cognitive computations (Forstmann & Wagen-15
makers, 2015; Palmeri et al., 2016). It has been noted before that the relative
lack of well-defined computational characterizations of comprehension processes
is one important factor hindering progress in explanatory understanding of the
neurobiology of language (Hagoort, 2009; Embick & Poeppel, 2015).
Recently, such motivations have led to adoption of computational linguistic20
methods in cognitive neuroscience (Brennan, 2016). Grounded in expectation-
based theories of sentence comprehension (Hale, 2001; Levy, 2008), statistical or
probabilistic language models which assign conditional probabilities to linguistic
representations (e.g., words, words’ parts-of-speech, or syntactic structures) in a
sequence are increasingly being used, in conjunction with information-theoretic25
complexity measures, to estimate word-by-word comprehension difficulty in neu-
roscience studies of language comprehension (Figure 1).
While the use of probabilistic language models represents a step forward
towards explicit account of expectation-based cognitive computations, it is im-
portant to critically acknowledge both the respective strengths and limitations.30
3
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What are the promises and pitfalls of the approach? What can we expect to
learn from it? Can probabilistic modeling go beyond localizing candidate cog-
nitive computations in space and time?
The purpose of this paper is to provide a balanced review and discussion of
the use of probabilistic language models in cognitive neuroscience of language.35
We first provide a cursory review of the general framework and review recent
example applications. We then critically discuss the promises and limitations of
this nascent interdisciplinary bridging. We conclude by outlining outstanding
questions for future research.
Figure 1: A schematic depiction of the interdisciplinary collaboration between probabilistic
modeling and cognitive neuroscience of language.
2. Probabilities and information in language40
2.1. Probabilistic constraints in language processing
Probabilistic models of cognition have witnessed a surge of interest in re-
cent years (Chater et al., 2006). In the domain of language, it has generally
4
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been recognised that the cognitive system is sensitive to distributional proper-
ties of the language input and that probabilistic constraints play a role in both45
early language acquisition and later language processing (Kuhl, 2010; Griffiths,
2011; Seidenberg, 1997). Empirical support for human sensitivity to statisti-
cal/probabilistic constraints at the level of words has been shown through the
word frequency effect on word recognition, disambiguation, and ease of pro-
cessing (see Jurafsky, 2002, for review and evidence). Additionally, the role of50
statistical/probabilistic constraints in language processing and production has
been shown through the effect of contextual constraints, that is, as graded sen-
sitivity of behavioural or neural measures (e.g., reading times or amplitudes of
event-related potentials) to how constraining the prior context is on possible
sentence continuations (Gibson & Pearlmutter, 1998).55
The effects of contextual constraints and word probabilities are commonly
interpreted as reflecting some form of graded prediction, expectation or antici-
pation in language comprehension (Huettig, 2015; see also Kuperberg & Jaeger,
2015, for a terminological remark). Word probability in sentences is normally
measured by means of human judgments in the cloze task (Taylor, 1953). In60
this task, participants are presented with sentence contexts where the target
word position is blank. They are asked to fill the blank with a plausible word.
The cloze probability of a word is then determined by counting the number of
participants that used the word to continue the sentence.
Word probability effects and effects of contextual constraints provide ev-65
idence that graded statistical/probabilistic constraints in the linguistic signal
and linguistic experience more broadly impact the real-time human language
processing system; however, in experimental settings the exact computations
explaining such effects are often not modelled explicitly. In what follows, we
provide a cursory review on how probabilistic information can be modeled and70
quantified formally.
5
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2.2. Probabilistic language models
In a nutshell, probabilistic language models are mathematical formalisms de-
scribing probability distributions over language data. One of the most common
applications of probabilistic language models is in so-called sequence-prediction75
tasks. In the case of language, this means probabilistic models can be used for
generating expectations about upcoming words given the words seen so far in a
sentence (usually up to a limited length).
A distinction can be made between sequence-based language models that
predict the words based on sequences of past words—a domain also called “sta-80
tistical language modelling”—and models that estimate the probability of a
syntactic structure underlying the observed sequence of words or the probabil-
ity of the upcoming word given the syntactic parse so far (see also Section 2.2.1
and Figure 2 below). This is a domain proper to “computational linguistics”
and as such normally considered distinct from statistical language modeling;85
there is, however, a great deal of overlap between the two research domains
(Rosenfeld, 2000).
For the sake of convenience, we will in this review subsume this distinction
and use a single term “probabilistic language models” because the neuroimaging
studies reviewed presently in Section 3 employ descriptions at both levels of90
granularity.
2.2.1. Common ways of estimating probabilities
How are language probabilities estimated? Three broader classes of models
are commonly used in computational psycholinguistics: n-gram models, phrase
structure grammars (PSGs), and neural networks.95
N -gram models, also known as Markov models, represent the simplest ar-
chitecture for estimating the probabilities. The term n-gram stands for any
sequence with the length of n-items where the model order n denotes the num-
ber of context words (n− 1) plus the word (n-th word) for which the probabil-
ity is computed (Jurafsky & Martin, 2009). Therefore, a 4-gram model takes100
into account three preceding words in a sequence for computing the conditional
6
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probability of occurrence for the fourth word. The basis for computing these
probabilities are the relative frequencies of co-occurrence of word sequences de-
rived from the training data in language corpora. We add that an n-gram can
stand for the sequence of actual words or, alternatively, syntactic categories of105
words (or parts-of-speech).
Apart from n-grams, probabilities of the upcoming words can also be esti-
mated by using either feed-forward (FNN) or recurrent neural network (RNN)
architectures (Bengio et al., 2003; see, De Mulder et al., 2015, for a recent re-
view on RNNs). In these architectures, the words are not represented as symbol110
strings as with n-grams, but are instead converted into vector representations;
each word is coded as a sequence of real numbers—a real-valued feature vector.
These vector representations are given as input to a pre-specified number of
neuron-like hidden units where activation of these units is given by mathemat-
ical functions and transformations applied to the word vectors.115
In recurrent neural networks, the hidden units also receive recurrent input
from the states encoded in previous steps (see Figure 2, bottom right) which
means any current state of the layer reflects the history (of an undetermined
length) of past network states (e.g., representing sentential context in language
tasks). During model training in word prediction tasks, the models adjust the120
weights (or parameters) assigned to each hidden unit and individual components
of word vectors such that the difference between words predicted by the model
and words that actually appear is minimized. The activation of the output units
are rescaled such that the output vector can be interpreted as a probability
distribution over words. Each unit’s activation is the estimated probability that125
the corresponding word will appear next, given the word sequence presented to
the model.
PSGs are sets of so-called rewrite rules relating a phrasal class (e.g., a noun
phrase) to its constituent parts of speech (e.g., a determiner, an adjective, and a
noun) to the actual word strings (e.g., “a red hat”). A PSG therefore provides,130
by sequentially applying the rewrite rules in a process called derivation, the
structural description underlying a given sequence of words. A probabilistic (or
7
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stochastic) PSG assigns a probability of a syntactic parse given a surface level
string, or the probability of the upcoming word given the syntactic parse so
far (Roark 2001, see also Figure 2, top right). The probability of the entire135
parse is determined as a joint probability of all rewrite rules needed to generate
the complete parse. The probabilities of rewrite rules are determined from
occurrences in syntactically-annotated corpora known as tree-banks (see, e.g.,
Marcus et al., 1993).
2.2.2. Context-boundedness and representations140
To see how these classes of models compare to one another, it is useful to
consider their characteristics along two key dimensions: whether there is a limit
to the amount of context considered for computing the conditional probabilities
(boundedness) and what is the nature of representations over which these mod-
els compute. This gross classification with boundedness and representations is145
schematically depicted in Figure 2.
In terms of the amount of context that can be taken into account for estimat-
ing the probabilities, models fall either in the category of bounded or unbounded
models (represented column-wise in Figure 2). Bounded models impose a finite
bound to the length of the preceding context considered; model classes with150
bounded limit are the n-gram models and feed-forward neural networks where
the probabilities are conditioned on a fixed number of preceding words. Recur-
rent neural networks and PSGs, on the other hand, are unbounded models. A
recurrent neural network’s hidden layer activation depends on the entire input
string so far (Figure 2, bottom right) whereas in PSGs the current word can155
depend on words at any earlier point which makes it possible to model long-
distance dependencies between the words—a hallmark of language structure.
The second classification dimension is the nature of representations over
which the models compute (represented row-wise in Figure 2); specifically, the
representations can either be symbolic or vector -based (the latter are also termed160
as: analogue, continuous or distributed representations). N -grams and PSGs
fall into the first category whereas feed-forward and recurrent neural networks
8
Page 10 of 39
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Figure 2: Classification of language models according to context-boundedness and the nature
of representations. Classification according to the type of representation is depicted row-wise,
and amount of context column-wise.
operate over continuous or distributed vector word representations. The critical
difference between the two types of representations is that symbolic representa-
tions (e.g., word strings “dog” and “cat”) can only be equal or unequal with no165
inherent measure of similarity apart from the relationship reflected in the fre-
quency of co-occurrence; in contrast, numerical, vector representations in neural
networks can be compared using a similarity measure. For example, because
a every vector has a direction in a vector-space, a distance between two word
vectors (quantifying semantic distance between two words encoded by these vec-170
tors) can be computed mathematically as a function of the angle between two
vectors (smaller angle indicates more closely related words).
9
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2.3. Quantifying complexity: entropy and surprisal
On the basis of probabilities estimated with probabilistic models described
above it is possible to compute the amount of information conveyed by each word175
in a sequence. This is quantified with information-theoretic complexity metrics
such as word surprisal and word entropy. A complexity metric is any measure
quantifying hypothesized processing difficulty at the current word and need
not be probabilistic; the number of nodes traversed in a hierarchical syntactic
derivation is another example of a metric capturing comprehension difficulty180
(Gibson & Thomas, 1999). For a complete treatment on information-theoretic
complexity metrics specifically, we point the reader to a recent review by Hale
(2016); here, we provide a brief overview to establish the necessary coherence
with rest of the paper.
Surprisal is an information-theoretic measure quantifying how unexpected185
and thus how informative the current word (wt) is given the words that precede
it (w1, ..., wt−1). A higher word surprisal values indicates that the currently
encountered word is less expected given the context. In mathematical terms,
surprisal S(wt) is defined as the negative logarithm of the word’s conditional
probability of occurrence:190
S(wt) = − logP (wt | w1, ..., wt−1) (1)
If base-2 logarithm is used, surprisal is expressed in bits. The same is true for
the word entropy information measure, which quantifies how narrow or spread-
out the probability distribution of possible next words is. If taken as a measure
of cognitive effort, it models the degree of the listener’s or reader’s uncertainty
about the upcoming word given the words encountered so far. Higher entropy195
values represent a higher degree of uncertainty (due to a higher number of
possible candidate continuations) whereas lower entropy values signify a higher
degree of certainty with fewer, highly probable continuations given the context
so far. Mathematically, entropy at the current word position H(t) is defined as
the expected value of surprisal for the upcoming word (wt+1) given the words200
10
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encountered so far (w1, ..., wt):
H(t) = −
∑
wt+1∈W
P (wt+1 | w1, ..., wt) logP (wt+1 | w1, ..., wt) (2)
where W denotes the set of all possible words.
Above, we introduced surprisal and entropy as defined over actually observed
words in sentences, however, both metrics can also be computed on the basis
of words’ parts-of-speech (Frank, 2010) or syntactic structures as obtained from205
probabilistic grammars (Hale, 2003; Roark et al., 2009). If the models take into
account the actually observed words, a metric is said to be lexicalized, whereas
in the case of unlexicalized metric, only structural probabilities or probabili-
ties of parts-of-speech are used for computing complexity (Demberg & Keller,
2008). In other words, unlexicalized complexity metrics are not concerned with210
lexical-semantic properties of language input. However, additional assumptions
are required on the type of syntactic structures plausibly involved in human
comprehension (Hale, 2003; Frank, 2013).
In addition to surprisal and entropy, another relevant complexity metric is
entropy reduction. Originally, Hale (2006) defined the entropy reduction re-215
sulting from integrating word wt into the derivation of the sentence so far, as
the amount by which uncertainty about the complete sentence’s structure gets
reduced by excluding structures incompatible with wt. In practice, however,
estimating the probabilities of all possible sentence structures is not feasible.
For this reason, the scope of the entropy computation has been reduced to,220
for example, the possible sentence continuations (Wu et al., 2010), a subset of
upcoming four words (Frank, 2013), or even just the single next word (Roark
et al., 2009).
In brief, cognitive neuroscience and probabilistic language modeling concep-
tually share a common point in emphasizing information processing and proba-225
bilistic aspects of language comprehension. We now turn to the literature where
probabilistic language models were used to analyze neural measures of interest.
11
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3. Example applications
Until recently, probabilistic language models were predominantly tested against
behavioral data, such as grammaticallity judgments, self-paced reading times,230
and eye-movements (e.g., Boston et al., 2008; Demberg & Keller, 2008; Frank
& Bod, 2011; Linzen & Jaeger, 2014; Lau et al., 2017). The use of probabilistic
language models in cognitive neuroscience of language comprehenension repre-
sents a recent trend; here we review six example studies where probabilistic
language models were used word-by-word to quantify complexity in sentence or235
story comprehension tasks. We begin by reviewing studies where information
measures represented the predictor of interest and continue with those where
they were used as an additional predictor to non-probabilistic complexity mea-
sures.
3.1. Information measures as the predictor of interest240
Given that word surprisal and entropy quantify different aspects of the in-
coming linguistic signal, Willems et al. (2016) used 3-gram language models and
asked whether the two measures yield distinct loci of activation in the brain while
participants listened to auditory narratives. Word entropy negatively correlated
with blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal in the right inferior frontal245
gyrus, the left ventral premotor cortex, left middle frontal gyrus, supplementary
motor area, and the left inferior parietal lobule whereas word surprisal showed
positive correlations bilaterally in the superior temporal lobes and in a set of
(sub)cortical regions in the right hemisphere (see Figure 3 below). These results
were interpreted within the predictive coding framework; regions sensitive to en-250
tropy were taken to reflect active predictions of the coming words (predictions
are possible in low entropy states) and areas related with word surprisal (how
surprising the current word is) were interpreted as possibly reflecting prediction
errors in the early auditory areas.
As explained in sections 2.2.1 and 2.3, language probabilities and complexity255
metrics can also be computed on the basis of syntactic structures. Henderson
12
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Figure 3: Brain areas activated more strongly (real stories compared with reversed story
fragments) for word surprisal (blue) and word entropy (red). Reproduced from Willems et al.
(2016).
et al. (2016) used the probabilistic phrase structure parser by Roark (2001) to
study the cortical infrastructure sensitive to syntactic surprisal during naturalis-
tic comprehension. The authors simultaneously measured BOLD responses and
eye-movements while participants silently read stories in paragraphs. A whole-260
brain comparison between word groups with high and low syntactic surprisal
revealed significant differences in the inferior frontal gyrus bilaterally, left an-
terior temporal lobes (under a less conservative statistical threshold), bilateral
insula, fusiform gyrus, and the putamen. There were no statistically significant
predicted differences in superior temporal lobes or the superior temporal sulcus.265
The authors discuss the results as in line with current neurobiological models
that place the cortical systems for syntactic computations to inferior frontal
and anterior temporal cortices. It is interesting to note that eye-tracking data
revealed no differences for the syntactic surprisal contrast; this stands in contrast
to previous reports showing relations between syntactic surprisal metrics and270
13
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eye movements (e.g., Boston et al., 2008; Demberg & Keller, 2008). The authors
speculate that the novel use of a lexicalized syntactic surprisal—as opposed to
unlexicalized syntactic surprisal used in previous reports—might be a possible
source of discrepancy.
In cognitive electrophysiology, one of the most studied signals is the event-275
related potential (ERP); time-averaged voltage deflections reflecting an inte-
grated (summed) response of large populations of spatially and temporally co-
herent cortical pyramidal neurons (Luck, 2005). Under the assumption that
those models and complexity metrics that best explain the data also more closely
resemble putative cognitive mechanisms, Frank et al. (2015) computed word280
surprisal and entropy reduction of words and their parts-of-speech under three
types of models: n-grams (n = 2, 3, and 4), phrase-structure grammars, and
recurrent neural networks.
Out of all the possible relations between word information measures and
six candidate ERP component amplitudes from an exploratory analysis, word285
surprisal measure computed on the basis of 4-grams and RNNs significantly
improved the fit of the regression model to the N400 ERP amplitude over and
above PSGs but not vice versa; that is, the inclusion of hierarchical syntactic
information in the models was not reflected in better statistical fit. In terms of
mechanistic interpretation, the authors take this result as compatible with the290
lexical retrieval account of the N400 component (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000).
3.2. Information measures as additional predictor
The studies reviewed above looked exclusively at the effects of information
measures computed by probabilistic language models. We now turn to studies
where such measures are investigated in addition to non-probabilistic measures295
of complexity.
Brennan et al. (2016) investigated the neural correlates of syntactic com-
plexity during naturalistic comprehension. Comprehension difficulty was char-
acterized with n-grams, PSGs, and minimalist grammars (a formal grammar
that accounts for syntactic phenomena not accounted for by PSGs). A stepwise300
14
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inclusion of progressively more “syntactically sophisticated” language predictors
improved the statistical fit to BOLD time courses in the bilateral anterior tem-
poral lobes, left inferior frontal gyrus, left posterior temporal lobe, left inferior
parietal lobule, and left premotor area. When taken on their own, the 2- and
3-gram surprisal measures revealed significant effects in the anterior temporal305
lobes, left inferior frontal gyrus and the left posterior temporal lobe.
Based on the fact that models including knowledge of hierarchical syntax
explained variance over and above the models that incorporate only linear,
word sequence-based statistics, the authors take their results as evidence for
the involvement of abstract syntactic linguistic knowledge in every-day sentence310
comprehension. The effects of surprisal are in part consistent with the results by
Willems et al. (2016) who similarly report word surprisal effect in the posterior
temporal lobe.
Nelson et al. (2017) investigated modulations of average high frequency (70-
150 Hz) power in intracranially recorded electrophysiological signals by hypothe-315
sized syntactic phrase-structure building operations during a word-by-word sen-
tence reading task. In model-comparison analysis, they contrasted explanatory
power of non-probabilistic hierarchical syntactic predictors (counting the num-
ber of open syntactic nodes at the moment when each word was presented) and
probabilistic language models. The former showed significant effects in several320
superior temporal and inferior frontal electrode sites, whereas lexical and part-
of-speech bigram surprisal (i.e., transition probability) and next-word entropy
showed positive and negative effects, respectively, in electrodes surrounding the
middle temporal gyrus.
Based on these results, the authors argue in favor of neurophysiological real-325
ity of hierarchical syntactic operations during comprehension. They interpreted
the probabilistic predictability effects as consistent with other reports localiz-
ing neural generators of single-word semantic priming, N400, and repetition
suppression effects to posterior temporal regions.
Van Schijndel & Schuler (2015) investigated the role of syntactic memory330
load during auditory story comprehension. The strength of spectral coherence
15
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of MEG oscillatory neural activity in the 10 Hz range was taken as a neural indi-
cator of increased working memory usage. Syntactic complexity was quantified
as the number of incomplete syntactic structures maintained at any word posi-
tion (depth of syntactic embeddedness estimated based on the most likely parse335
of a probabilistic PSG). N -gram probability predictors and a PSG surprisal
were used as control measures.
The authors report that the average alpha-band coherence in a pair of left
posterior and anterior sensors range was significantly different for two levels of
syntactic depth while controlling for n-gram probability effects; trigram prob-340
ability showed marginal alpha coherence effects prior to correcting for multiple
comparisons. Similar to the interpretations by Brennan et al. (2016) and Nelson
et al. (2017), the authors interpreted the results as showing that hierarchical
linguistic structure is computed during comprehension because it improves the
fit to empirical data over competitive non-hierarchical models.345
Finally, apart from regression-based analyses and factorial designs, the sta-
tistical relationship between neural data and language model output can also
be ascertained by means of multivariate statistical techniques, for example, by
using features of a language model in an intermediate step for decoding stimulus
identity from multivariate neural data. Wehbe et al. (2015) report that binary350
word classification accuracy based on MEG amplitudes, which in turn were pre-
dicted by RNN output vectors—interpreted as word probabilities—, was highest
approximately 400 msec after word onset, which can be seen as consistent with
results by Frank et al. (2015) who found a positive correlation between lexical
surprisal and the N400 amplitude. On the basis of the time-course of classifi-355
cation accuracy, the authors linked the late effect of word probability to word
integration processes (that differ between unpredictable and predictable words).
3.3. Summary
Current applications of probabilistic language models in cognitive neuro-
science show that probabilistic language models can be used with hemodynamic360
and electrophysiological methods and allow researchers to investigate and focus
16
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on spatial fingerprints for specific linguistic computations in cortical regions
(Willems et al., 2016; Henderson et al., 2016) or to compare predictions of dif-
ferent models against each other on the basis of same neurobiological data, be
it fMRI time courses (Brennan et al., 2016), language event-related M/EEG365
components (Frank et al., 2015; Wehbe et al., 2015), or spectral contents of
electrophysiological signals (Van Schijndel & Schuler, 2015; Nelson et al., 2017).
The studies employed language stimuli in both auditory and visual modalities
and, with the exception of the studies by Frank et al. (2015) and Nelson et al.
(2017), used language stimuli in naturalistic, narrative contexts. We now turn370
to a more detailed discussion of specific advantages and disadvantages of the
approach.
4. Advantages
4.1. Formalized cognitive computations
What can we expect to learn from model-based analyses? Probabilistic lan-375
guage models represent the computational level of explanation in cognitive neu-
roscience in the time-honoured sense of Marr (1982): What aspect of the lan-
guage input enters into the computation? What is being computed and why?
Quantitative methods represent a complement to subtraction paradigms in neu-
roimaging (see Hagoort, 2014, for a recent review on sentence comprehension)380
where cognitive computations are inferred on the basis of informal, qualitative
task-based cognitive contrasts.
Reading off cognitive computations from tasks is not straightforward (Boone
& Piccinini, 2016) in that it must first be assured that the task taps into the tar-
get linguistic computation and not, for example, meta-linguistic processes. This385
can be assured by comparing several informal task contrasts (see, e.g., Kaan &
Swaab, 2002, for a discussion on task contrasts for syntactic computations) or
by computationally modelling the task itself (see, e.g., Norris et al., 2000, for
a model of phoneme monitoring). Only once this is established, it is possible
to draw links to the observed neural effects. In model-based approaches, how-390
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ever, markers of sentence-level cognitive computations, for example syntactic
surprisal, are directly statistically related to neural signals.
From a methodological perspective, explicit mathematical definitions and
computational implementations lead to a more rigorous and standardized quan-
tification of independent variables which reduces dependence on researchers’395
operationalizations of specific concepts (but see section 5.1 for potential pitfalls
related to allures of formalization).
4.2. Theory evaluation
In other domains of cognitive neuroscience, such as decision-making and
cognitive control, linking neural data to parameters of formal models served as400
a fruitful way to overcome the impasse when competing models could not be
distinguished based on overt behavioral responses alone (Forstmann et al., 2011).
As such, model comparison proved to be a major contribution of combining
model-based approaches with neurobiological data (Mars et al., 2012). Given
the fast pace and incrementality of language comprehension processes, covert,405
online measures of comprehension difficulty such as eye-movement records have
been a key component of empirical evaluations for competing models in reading
and spoken comprehension (see Rayner, 1998; Huettig et al., 2011, for reviews).
Brain signals can be similarly considered as covert markers of online cognitive
difficulty and as such taken as empirical test bed for cognitive hypotheses im-410
plemented in language models. Whereas compared to model-based approaches
in other domains, neural measures do not necessarily represent exclusive di-
agnostic data for evaluating cognitive theories, any neurophysiologically valid
cognitive theory should ultimately account for neural measures as these are
closely linked to the underlying neural computations. As such, neural validation415
of cognitive theories provides cognitive-computational constraints for plausible
neuronal computations (Mars et al., 2012; Palmeri et al., 2016, see also Section
5.5 below).
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4.3. Statistical efficiency in analyses
In most current empirical applications of language models, complexity met-420
rics are computed for all words in experiments which improves statistical sen-
sitivity in the studies compared to the traditional experimental approach. For
example, the three stories used by Willems et al. (2016) yielded approximately
3,000 words, all of which were considered as separate trials in the analysis. This
contrasts with the currently prevailing experimental approaches, where, most425
often, studies will only investigate neurobiological effects on target words in
non-filler items. This of course follows from the logic of experimental designs;
however, it also means that large stretches of neural data are collected without
being inspected or considered in the analysis.
Further, probabilistic language models provide a quantification over a range430
of values, rather than only the extreme poles of the spectrum which is common in
subtraction-based designs (but see, e.g., Pallier et al., 2011, for an exception). In
case of significant statistical dependence between variables, parametric variation
gives stronger support to the actual workings posited by the model compared
to factorial designs (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2010).435
4.4. Naturalistic stimuli and data reuse
Apart from explicitness and increased statistical sensitivity of research de-
signs, there is another potential advantage of language modelling: it makes it
easier to study the brain responses to naturalistic stimuli (Brennan, 2016). Even
though the study of language in its ecological setting has in certain cognitive440
traditions been regarded as an ill-advised enterprise on principled and practical
grounds (Chomsky, 1959, 1995), it was highlighted as a necessary empirical step
to study the brain from the systems level (see Hasson & Honey, 2012; Small &
Nusbaum, 2004).
The approaches reviewed here strike a balance between the two perspectives:445
while the computational part enables rigorous formalization of the cognitive hy-
pothesis, absence of secondary task during the experiment enables the study
the of brain responses to more ecologically valid stimuli. Studying the brain
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in naturalistic settings is a desirable research approach (for a recent overview
of challenges and developments, see the contributions in Willems, 2015), nev-450
ertheless, we hasten to add that it should complement established experimen-
tal approaches which capitalize on well-controlled task-based designs (see e.g.
Fetsch, 2016, for a recent opinion on the importance of experimental designs);
for example because a specific cognitive hypothesis might not be available and
implemented as a probabilistic language model.455
It is also worth emphasizing that the absence of specific task constraints in
the experimental design lends these types of neuroimaging data sets appropri-
ate for reuse and sharing for analyses with new language models that embody
novel hypotheses; a component of contemporary research practice which is be-
ing actively recognized in the neuroscience community (Poldrack & Gorgolewski,460
2014).
5. Limitations and pitfalls
Even though probabilistic modeling comes with evident advantages, it has,
as is true for any methodological advancements, specific limitations. In light of
increasing acceptance of model-based analyses by experimental cognitive neu-465
roscientists, it is important to render these pitfalls explicit.
5.1. Allures of formalization
Due to their computational implementation and quantitative nature, for-
mally estimated language probabilities can be seen as representing a more ob-
jective estimate than measures of cloze probability obtained on the basis of470
subjective, human judgments (Staub, 2015). It is true that language models
and complexity metrics improve the comparability between experiments and
can be viewed as more objective from that point of view.
Nevertheless, even for formal estimates the extent to which they capture the
“ground truth” can be debated. Using complexity measures obtained from a475
single language model on experimental stimuli would be comparable to using
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judgments of a single participant for quantifying measures of cloze probabilities
(see also Smith & Levy, 2011, for discussion on the two types of language prob-
abilities). The complementarity of the two ways of estimating probabilities is
further underscored if we consider that in speech recognition tasks, for example,480
human judgments (providing knowledge not captured in the models alone) can
be used to improve model performance (Rosenfeld, 2000).
Second, probabilistic language models describe the probability distributions
over words but do not model the human language acquisition trajectory. Specif-
ically, models are trained on large amounts of language data which does not485
correspond to how such knowledge is acquired by humans, who exploit a variety
of other multimodal sensory and social cues (see Kuhl, 2010; Saffran, 2003, for
reviews). From an explanatory perspective, it would therefore be inaccurate
to implicitly treat models trained on collections of text as models of language
acquisition.490
5.2. Lexical confounds
All ways of estimating formal language probabilities, in one way or another,
rely on observed frequencies of occurrence in collections of texts – language
corpora. Together with the fact that complexity measures are computed on a
word-by-word basis, this means that by construction probabilistic complexity495
measures are likely to correlate with well-known lexical nuisance variables in psy-
cholinguistics, for example, lexical frequency (i.e., unigram probability), word
length, phonological neighbourhood size, transitional probability (i.e., bigram
probability, etc.).
These lexical measures characterize separate aspects of words. For example,500
lexical frequency is a property of the word alone whereas a 4-gram probability is
conditioned on the three preceding words and therefore operationalizes context-
dependent computations. Whereas both can be viewed as effects of “lexical
predictability”, they can be related to distinct cognitive computations; for ex-
ample, genuine predictive processing or ease of lexical retrieval (Staub 2015;505
Huettig 2015, see also Kuperberg & Jaeger 2015).
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Given that probabilistic language models afford the use of less experimen-
tally constrained, naturalistic stimuli, confound variables must be controlled
statistically. They should be included as covariates of no interest in regression-
type analyses; for example Frank et al. (2015) included word frequency, word510
length, and word position in the sentence as nuisance variables. Alternatively,
in factorial designs, it must be ensured that experimental conditions are chosen
such that they are matched for other lexical variables as was done in Henderson
et al. (2016). The list of potentially confounding variables can extend depend-
ing on the experimental settings; in an eye-tracking study, Demberg & Keller515
(2008), for example, included also the eye-movement specific variables about
whether the previous word was fixated or not, launch distance, and fixation
landing position in addition to word length, word frequency, forward transi-
tional probability, backward transitional probability, and word position in the
sentence.520
5.3. Syntactic and semantic complexity
A distinction between abstract, syntactic computations and meaning-bearing
semantic operations has been a cornerstone in cognitive sciences of language and
represents a theoretical framework for research cognitive neuroscience (see, e.g.,
Friederici & Weissenborn, 2007; Kuperberg, 2007, for discussion). A word’s525
frequency of co-occurrence is in principle governed by both its syntactic va-
lence and its lexical-semantic relationships to neighbouring words. In terms of
probabilistic language models, it is important to note that lexical, word-based
probabilistic language models (n-grams, RNNs) reviewed presently cannot dis-
entangle sources of semantic and syntactic complexities apart.530
Whereas the issue of resolving semantic and syntactic influences at the level
of words seems to be a technical rather than a principled one (see Pado´ et al.,
2009; Frank & Vigliocco, 2011, for suggestions on formalizing syntactic versus
semantic probabilities), at present, lexical-semantic influences on probability es-
timates can be overcome by using predictors based on unlexicalized complexity535
measures on the basis parts-of-speech n-gram models as in Frank et al. (2015)
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or probabilistic PSGs rather than actual words themselves as was done by Hen-
derson et al. (2016); Brennan et al. (2016)
5.4. Linguistic levels of analysis
A hallmark of linguistic analyses is to view the language system as comprising540
of different levels of linguistic granularity, minimally of the phonological, lexical-
semantic (word-based) and syntactic linguistic levels (Jackendoff, 2002). One
of the important properties of language models and complexity metrics is that
in practice these can be computed per each word in a sentence capturing the
incrementality of human sentence processing (Hale, 2016).545
However, it must be emphasized, that neural effects are cannot always be
assessed for all individual words. For example, temporal evolution of the BOLD-
response as measured with fMRI is slower than the presentation rate of words.
However, this limitation can be overcome for instance by performing linear re-
gression with a regressor which differs on a word-by-word basis such as perplexity550
or lexical frequency, (see Yarkoni et al., 2008, for illustration of this approach).
5.5. Explanatory status: maps or mapping?
Finally, it is worth touching upon the explanatory scope of the approach
presented here. What constitutes an adequate account of explanation (in the
sense of Craver, 2007) in cognitive neuroscience and how to approach it remains555
a debated topic and has received increased attention in cognitive neuroscience
communities recently (see Pulvermu¨ller et al., 2014; Embick & Poeppel, 2015;
Jonas & Kording, 2017; Krakauer et al., 2017, for some recent discussions). It
has been emphasized previously that localizing specific cognitive computations
to circumscribed cortical areas does not in itself constitute a sufficient explana-560
tion (Poeppel, 2012).
Seeking a fit between probabilistically modeled cognitive states and neural
data by means of a statistical model remains silent on the algorithmic and the
neural levels of explanation. Specifically, complexity metrics are estimators of
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comprehension difficulty and can provide evidence for or against cognitive the-565
ories to the extent that the latter provide distinct predictions on where in a
sentence the human cognitive system will experience difficulties (Martin, 2016).
Currently, probabilistic models do not offer explanations in terms of how the
cognitive (and neural) computation is achieved (but see Hale, 2011, for an algo-
rithmic proposal). Clearly, any empirical success of probabilistic language mod-570
els in explaining neural signals does not entail that mathematical formalisms,
information measures or language probabilities per se are instantiated in the
brain (Jurafsky, 2002).
From the perspective of neurophysiological explanation, current fMRI-based
applications stay within what has been dubbed the “cartographic imperative”575
(Poeppel, 2012) with the goal of tentatively localizing hypothesized computa-
tions to gross-level brain areas (as in Willems et l., 2016; Henderson et al.,
2016). On the other hand, electrophysiological results are predominantly in-
forming cognitive theories (as in Frank et al., 2015; Van Schijndel & Schuler,
2015). However, it is becoming increasingly clear in cognitive and systems neuro-580
sciences that brain signals are not only indices representing diagnostic evidence
for theories cast at the cognitive-computational levels of analyses, but are bio-
physically meaningful signals reflecting underlying neuronal computations and
circuit configurations (Cohen, 2017) occurring at lower levels of spatio-temporal
cortical organizations (this is conveyed by the upper part of our schematic in585
Figure 1). In this respect, electrophysiological methods represent a powerful
tool, compared to hemodynamic methods, due to a closer link between electro-
physiological events at lower spatial scales (as in Nelson et al., 2017, where high
frequency power is taken to reflect neural computation).
Although model-based analyses reviewed above can reveal what information590
content during comprehension makes a difference in terms of neural signals,
this type of correlational “bridging” represents an initial step towards a more
ambitious goal of describing the plausible neural computational principles that
explain the mapping to hypothesized linguistic/cognitive computations and tax-
onomies (Dehaene et al., 2015; see also Marcus et al., 2014). If probabilistic595
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computations at some level represent a valid cognitive hypothesis underlying
the behaviour, this should provide constraints on the target neural computa-
tions, mechanisms and algorithmic descriptions. Before concluding, we outline
below some outstanding challenges that deserve further attention in the future.
6. Future challenges600
Cognitive neuroscience shows that human listeners can integrate several
sources of information to interpret an utterance (Hagoort & van Berkum, 2007).
This translates into a long-standing challenge in the language modeling com-
munity: how can we bring probabilistic models to bear on larger linguistic units
and contextually relevant information, for example by making use of discourse605
coherence in models of sentence comprehension, long short term memory neural
networks etc. (e.g., Dubey et al., 2013; Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997)?
Similarly, different classes of models perform with different success rates
on empirical data. If a certain class of models (e.g., n-grams or PSGs) turns
out to be consistently more successful empirically, what are the consequences for610
neurocognitive theories? Which aspect of the model architecture (the underlying
cognitive hypothesis) or model training yields this difference compared to other
models?
Theoretical and empirical investigations in psycholinguistics and cognitive
neuroscience show that language processing consists of distinct representational615
and temporal scales, including, but not limited to, at the level of phonemes,
words, sentences, and discourse (Jackendoff, 2002; Lerner et al., 2011). Typ-
ically, these stages are investigated in separate experiments with different ex-
perimental paradigms. Can probabilistic language models be used as a tool for
investigating expectation-based processing at distinct representational and tem-620
poral levels of complexity concurrently in a single experiment within the same
dataset (e.g., Lopopolo et al., 2017)?
Regardless of the specific computational theory embedded in the models,
efforts should be spent in laying out the constraints to algorithmic and neuro-
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physiological explanations (see Embick & Poeppel, 2015; Martin, 2016). How625
does probabilistic cognitive computation relate to the general principles of cor-
tical organization for language and other cognitive-perceptual systems (e.g.,
Battaglia et al., 2012; Friederici & Singer, 2015)? What general property of
cortical circuitry is required to explain any observed correlations and directions
of the effects between probabilistic computation and neurobiological signals?630
More specifically, what neuronal circuit configuration and computation allows
us to make a linking hypothesis to probabilistic cognitive computation? What
statistical learning mechanisms must be in place to account for development of
probabilistic computation in language (as in Kumaran et al., 2016)?
Lastly, probabilistic language models reduce the dimensions of language com-635
prehension by focusing on the properties of the linguistic signal alone. An
important explanatory consideration of the what and the why of probabilistic
language computation will eventually have to account for the pragmatic and
communicative perspective on language understanding: What purpose would
probabilistic language computation serve in models of pragmatic language un-640
derstanding as probabilistic inference (Goodman & Frank, 2016)? What does
probabilistic computation entail for the rapid and flexible human communica-
tive behaviour in social and interactional settings (see e.g., Levinson, 2015; Stolk
et al., 2015)?
7. Conclusion645
In the present paper, we provided a general overview of probabilistic lan-
guage models, presented example applications in neuroscience studies, and dis-
cussed advantages and disadvantages. The approach advocated here should be
viewed as complementary to the established experimental paradigms in cog-
nitive neuroscience. Probabilistic language models provide computationally650
implemented tools for evaluating cognitive theories on neural data, mapping
cognitive computations to gross-level brain areas, and offer tentative cognitive-
computational explanation of electrophysiological responses. Future challenges
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lie in widening the scope of language models to meet the known characteristics of
human linguistic-communicative capacities and moving from brain mapping to655
linking specific cognitive explanations of macroscopic brain signals to plausible
underlying neuronal computations.
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